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FACT-FREE GUN POLICY?
PHILIPJ. COOKt &JENS LUDWIG"

INTRODUCTION

Dan M. Kahan and Donald Braman's interesting article is addressed to those "academics and others who want to help resolve the
gun controversy."' That's not us. The pragmatic goal of our labors in
the consequentialist realm of empirical research has been to determine what works and at what cost.: Good answers to these questions
strike us as important precursors to any satisfactory "resolution" of the
debate. Indeed, our goal is not to end or resolve the debate, but to
develop sound information that at least some voters and authorities
may find useful. We aspire to be a sort of Consumer Reports for gun
policy, not multicultural marketers.
But do facts actually affect gun policy in the real world? Kahan
and Braman argue, persuasively, that "cultural worldviews" influence
how individuals perceive gun control measures. We are convinced.
From there, however, Kahan and Braman draw a somewhat puzzling-and almost certainly erroneous-conclusion that culture matters, and therefore, evidence on consequences does not matter. Why
can't both culture and consequences matter? The fallacy is the same
as in the old question: Do you walk to school or carry your lunch?
As a matter of fact, factual information has helped steer popular
opinion in debates where voters held strong and conflicting cultural
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attitudes, including in the area of guns. And, equally important, empirical research may affect public policy directly, independent of its
influence on public opinion, by informing the decisions of courts, bureaucrats, and other actors in the policymaking process.
I. CULTURE, THE PARTIAL EXPLANATION

Needless to say, there are differences in opinion about gun control, and those differences tend to follow certain patterns. Views ol
gun control measures have been correlated with objective characteristics such as gender, race, region, religion, and military experience, as
well as with such subjective matters as trust in government and judgment concerning the protection offered by the police.4 Kahan and
Braman demonstrate that the two scales they construct from answers
to survey questions, which, according to them, measure two dimensions of the respondent's "cultural worldview," are also associated with
views on gun control. They find that people who are opposed to gun
control tend to be less supportive of government social and regulatory
programs (their individualism-solidarismscale) and tend to be less progressive with respect to race, sexual orientation, and capital punishment (their hiierarciy-egalilarianismscale). But while circumstances
and culture help "explain" (in a statistical sense) attitudes toward gun
control, that is not the whole story.
For one thing, people's views of gun control depend on the specific policy measure in question. Arguably the best data available on
attitudes toward gun policy come from nationally representative surveys collected in 1996, 1997, and 1998 by the University of Chicago's
National Opinion Research Center (NORC). The NORC surveys
show overwhelming support for moderate gun control measures: 88%
of respondents believed that all handguns should be "child proofed,"
81 % believed that handgun sales should be limited to one per person
per month, 82% believed that handguns should be registered, 77%
supported background check requirements for private gun sales, and
89% believed that people who have been convicted of domestic-
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violence misdemeanors should be prohibited from purchasing guns.
But broad support for more stringent measures is lacking; the same
NORC surveys found that only approximately 37% of the respondents
favored a general ban on handgun possession outside of their use in
law enforcement.
If support for gun control were driven entirely by scorn for guns
and the desire to "equalize wealth, status, and power,"7 why is it that
over half of those who support moderate controls oppose a ban on the
private ownership of handguns? It seems that much of the public is
not judging these matters solely from their cultural gut but instead
have a rather nuanced view of gun policy. More striking still is the
finding that a majority of gun owners support each of the moderate
gun control measures discussed above." Thus, it appears that even
"individualistic, hierarchical" gun owners may support the "egalitarian, solidaristic" goal of reducing gun violence through government
regulation.
Further evidence that there is more to the story comes from Kahan and Braman's own analysis. (We set aside for the moment the
irony of their using multivariate regression analysis as a tool of persuasion to argue that multivariate regression analyses are not persuasive!)
Kahan and Braman's measures of cultural attitudes among respondents to the General Social Surveys (GSS) plus their measures of the
sociodemographic, religious, and regional backgrounds of respondents, together only explain 8% of the variation in people's attitudes
toward gun control." Is there some reason to believe that facts are entirely irrelevant in explaining the remaining 92% of the variation in
the public's attitudes about gun policy?
II. Do

STATISTICS EVER PERSUADE?

Kahan and Braman argue that people will "credit or dismiss empirical evidence... depending on whether it coheres or conflicts with
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SURvEY OF THE NATIONAl. OPINION RESEARCH CENTER 42 1)1.6 (2000) (displaying levels

o stupport for various gun con trol measures).
I Kahan & Braman, supra note I, at 1297.
8 See Teret et al., supra note 5, at 814 tbl.2, 815 tbl.3, 816 tbl.4 (reporting the resuIlts of polls asking gun owners if they would support various gun control policies and
regulations).
9 Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1306
tbl. I.
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their cultural values.""' While this response undoubtedly occurs, facts
surely are not irrelevant. But the Kahan-Braman analysis is not suited
to determine the role of factual information. We illustrate this point
by replicating their analysis for two other outcome variables: whether
the respondent smokes or not, and whether the respondent used a
condom during her last sexual encounter.
Our Table 1 reports the results of our effort to replicate Kahan
and Braman's regression analysis presented in their Table 1 and then
reports the results of the same regression specification with the two
other dependent variables." As seen in the first column, our numbers
confirm the Kahan-Braman results: the likelihood that a GSS respondent during the 1988 to 2000 waves reports favoring "a law which
would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she
could buy a gun" is positively and statistically significantly related to
the two "culture" variables, even after conditioning on race, gender,
religion, region, educational attainment, socioeconomic status, and
political affiliation. We present unstandardized regression coefficients
in our Table 1, which we believe are consistent with what is shown in
Kahan and Braman's Table .1; the general patterns of results are qualitatively similar for standardized regression coefficients.
The remaining columns in our Table 1 demonstrate that some of
the same variables help predict whether the individual smokes or used
a condom in her last sexual encounter. In particular, the "culture"
variables are statistically important." People who are more progressive in their views (our interpretation of the hierarchy-egalitarianism
scale) are less likely to smoke and more likely to use a condom. People who are favorably disposed toward government social programs
(the individualism-solidarism scale) are more likely to use a condom.
Cultural worldview appears as relevant for these behaviors as for opinions about gun control.

1 d. at 1292.
H Thanks to Dan Kahan and Donald Braman for sharing their data. While their
choice about how to code a number of the control variables differs from what we
would choose (for example, we disagree with their calculation of a Z-score for dummy
variables linked to sex, race, religion, and urbanicity), their version of the data file is
sufficient to illustrate our central point.
21 The sample sizes are smaller for smoking than for gun
control attitudes because
the gun question was asked in more of the GSS surveys between 1988 and 2000 than
was the smoking question. We note that the results are not driven by differences in
samples or sample sizes because we obtained very similar results for the gun control
regression when we restricted the analytic sample to the respondents who answered
the smoking question.
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Yet even with this apparent relevance of cultural worldview to
smoking and condom use, we know that people's attitudes and behaviors about smoking and unprotected sex have changed dramatically
over time. The changes have occurred, in part, in response to a growing body of epidemiological research about the health risks associated
with each of these activities. For example, it is widely accepted that
scientific information on smoking, released in the form of reports
from the Surgeon General, public service ads, and mandated warnings
on cigarette packs, accounted for much of the upward shift in the
public's perception of risks associated with smoking and the remarkable decline in smoking since 1980.1" Put differently, statistical evidence can affect people's attitudes and behaviors even in areas where
cultural attitudes run deep.
Further evidence on how facts can matter comes from the history
of gun control legislation. The most important legislation in the postWar era was the Gun Control Act of 1968, which included a ban on
sales of handguns to out-of-state customers.'
Senator Thomas Dodd
laid the groundwork for this ban through staff studies of gun trafficking in 1961 and 1962, followed by public hearings in 1963.' These efforts represented the first body of policy-oriented research on firearms
markets.'' Writing in 1966, journalist Carl Bakal noted that "[n]o
other firearms proposal in our history was based on such extensive research as the measure that was to become known as the Dodd Bill." 7
Of course, it took several more years and strong leadership from the
Johnson administration to get Congress to act, but Dodd's research
helped give the proposed ban a credible basis.
Moreover, many knowledgeable people behave (and spend their
money) as iffacts were relevant for public attitudes, even those concerning gun policy. Gun manufacturers such as Beretta sponsor print
advertisements that encourage readers to "[t]ip the odds in [their] fa-

13 See W. Kip Viscusi, SMOKING:

MAKING TIIE RISKY DECISION 48-59 (1992)

(re-

viewing the public perception of the risks associated with smoking and attributing the
increased recognition of risk to hazard warnings and a ban on television and radio ad-

vertising).

14 Pub. L. No. 90-618, § 101, 82 Stat. 1213, 1216-18 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 922 (2000)).
I'See Franklin E. Zimring, Firearms and Federal Law: The Gun Control Act of 1968,
4
J. LEGAL STUD. 133, 133-45 (1975) (outlining the activities of Dodd's committee, which
addressed the mail-order gun problem).
W Kristin Anne Goss, Disarmed: The Real American Gun Control
Paradox 47
(2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with authors).
17 CARL BAKAL, No RIGHT To BEAR ARMS 185
(Paperback Library ed. 1968).
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vor" by purchasing a handgun."' State legislatures across the country
have invited economist John Lott to testify about his research on the
effects of permissive gun-carrying laws, and The Wall Street Journal has
opened its "Op-Ed" space to a number of Lott's essays about the futility of gun control measures.'
If Lott's statistical research had no
chance of persuading anyone, why would anticontrol groups call on
him and procontrol groups attempt to impugn his professional objectivity? ' Why would anticontrol activists work to discredit an ongoing
National Research Council review of the firearms research literature if
technical reviews of statistical findings had no power to persuade?! '
III. NOTJUST VOTERS

Perhaps the most noteworthy example of how statistical research
may affect public policy comes from the landmark 1954 Supreme
Court case Brown v. Board of Education22 regarding school segregation,
an area that is not, it seems fair to say, devoid of cultural conflict. As
Chief Justice Warren famously argued, citing the empirical research

IsSee Ion S. Vernick et al., RegulatingFirearm Advertisements That 1romise Home Proteclion, 277JAMA 1391, 1392-93 (1997) (reprinting the Beretta ad and reviewing studies
of gun use in the home).
9 See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr.,
Editorial, More Guns, Less Violent Crime, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 28, 1996, at Al 3 (providing a preview of his study with David B. Mustard, later
published as Crime, Deterrence, and Right-to-Cany Concealed Handguns, 26J. LEGAL STUD.
I (1997)) John R. LottJr., Editorial, The Real Lesson of the School Shootings, WALL ST.J.,
Mar. 27, 1998, at A14 (noting that Arkansas's school shootings occurred in a locale
where possessing gtns was actually illegal and reiterating the claim that "shall-issue"
concealed handgun laws reduce murder rates).
20 When John Lott's research findings on permissive
gun-carrying laws were first
released, gun control advocates such as the Violence Policy Center tried to discredit
Lott by pointing to the possible links between the Olin Corporation (which owns Winchester Ammunition) and the visiting Olin Fellowship that Lott held at the time at the
University of Chicago Law School. hinder of the Loft CCWStldy Has Links tothe Gun /ndustqy, Violence Policy Center, at http://www.vpc.org/fact-sht/lottlink.htni (1999).
Gun control opponenLs have attempted to discredit those scholars offering substantive criticisms of Lott's methods and conclusions. For instance, conservative columnist Ann Coulter attacked one critic by calling him a "Democrat." Ann Coulter,
More Facts, Fewer Liberats, ot http://wwwV.anncoulter.org/coLImns/2001/030801.htm
(Mar. 8, 2001).
21 See, e.g.,John R. Lott, Jr., Gin Panl Heals with an Ear Shut, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 31,
2001, at B15 (arguing that government funding and review of firearms research is influencecd by political motivations); Dave Kopel & Glenn Reynolds, Political Science: Doing Science a Grove Injustice, NAT'L REV. ONLINE, at http://www.nationalreviev.com/
kopel/kope1O82901 .shtml (Aug. 29, 2001) (describing members of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) review panel as "antigun").
22 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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by Kenneth Clark and others, "Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children ....
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority." ' This example also serves to highlight
another argument against Kahan and Braman's pessimistic view about
the potential of empirical research to influence public policy: voters
and politicians are not the only actors involved in setting public policies, and thus not the only relevant target audience for statistical research.
Just as they were in the case of desegregation, judges and juries
will become an increasingly important constituency for social science
research in the area of gun control. More than thirty cities and counties have filed lawsuits against the gun industry charging negligence or
public nuisance.
Many of these lawsuits will hinge on questions
about how the design and marketing practices of gun manufacturers
and dealers affect rates of crime and violence-that is, questions that
are unavoidably factual and can only be answered through statistical
analysis.
Administrative agencies also play a role in setting public policy, often on the basis of statistical social science evidence. For example, the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC) was mandated by Congress to regulate products and suggest changes to, or even prohibition
of, products that pose unacceptable risks to public health. Assessments of these risk levels come, of course, from statistical analysis of
population injury data. It is true that the CPSC does not regulate firearms; they were explicitly exempted from CPSC oversight by Congress. ' But this lacuna says more about the political clout of the gun
lobby at the time of the enacting legislation for CPSC than it does
about the intrinsic limitations of empirical analysis to inform public

23 Id. at 494 (internal quotation omitted); see also KENNETH
B. CLRK, PREJUDICE
AND YOUR CHIL) 87-88 (1955) (addressing the Supreme Court's use of this language
and ultimate rejection of segregation).
24 Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Litigation as Regulation:
Firearms, in REGUIATION
THROUGH LITIGATION 67, 67 (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002).
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 2054(b) (2000) (listing the general
duties of the CPSC).
2I See Pub. L. No. 94-284, § 3(e), 90 Stat. 504, 504 (1976)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §
2080 (2000)) (prohibiting the CPSC from restricting the "manufacture or sale of firearms").
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policy. At least one state, Massachusetts, has begun regulating fireuctsY
arms as consumer prod

The power of statistics to persuade remains evident in other areas
of the gun policy debate as well. For example, this influence appears
in the countless decisions made by national, state, and local law enforcement agencies about where, when, and how to deploy their resources in the battle against gun violence. Police in New York City use
mapping and other statistical software to identify crime "hot spots" to
be targeted for additional patrol activity,2 8 a practice that has now
been adopted in many other cities as well. New York's aggressive antigun police patrols have also been motivated in part by the evaluation
of a social science experiment in Kansas City.9 And as part of the
Bush administration's Project Safe Neighborhoods initiative, local law
enforcement agencies from across the country receive funds from the
federal government to partner with local U.S. Attorneys' offices and
other federal agencies to identify interventions aimed at combating
gun crime in their areas.
These local-federal partnerships are de-

27

See Fnfocement Notice # 3, Attorney General's 1Han dgun Sales Regulations (940 CM?

16.00), Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, at http://
WwWw.ago.state.ma. us/con pro/guns.asp?head 2=Handguns&paren t=1 62&section= 17
(Feb. 2002) (discussing Massachusetts's current handgun regulations).
29 See Mapping Crime Acrss Nev York State, Vera Institute of Justice, at
http://
wvw.vera.og/project/projectl 1.asp?section id=2&projectjid=6 (last visited Apr. 24,
2003) (providing information on New York State's crime mapping program, and noting that "[t]
he New York City Police Department helped pioneer" this ool for law enforcement).
29

See LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN E

AL., NATIL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF

JUSTIcE, THE KANSAS Cm' GUN EXPERIMENT 9 (1995) (discussing the experiment and
noting "[d]irected patrol around gun crime hot spots is about three times nore costeffective than normal uniformed police activity citywide, on average, in getting guns
off the street"); Lawrence W. Sherman & Dennis 1'. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures oi Gun
Violence: "Hot Spots" Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673, 676-92 (1995) (describing
and examining the Kmsas City gun experiment). While, ultimately, the evidence from
Kansas City may be somewhat less definitive than local police departments widely believe, more recent evaluations of similar policing interventions also provide evidence
of some positive effects on crime. See Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Lulwig, Policing Cime
Cons, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY, supra note 2, at 217, 220 (discussing a similar program in Pittsburgh, and concluding "the Pittsburgh program provides at least suggestive evidence that targeted patrols against illegally carried guns may reduce gun
crime").
30 For a description of tie funding sources and multilevel collaboration
initiated
through Project Safe Neighborhoods, see Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Attorney
General Ashcroft Announces Record Increase in Federal Firearms Prosecutions, New
Resources to Prevent and Prosecute Gun Violence (Jan. 30, 2003), available at
http://wwV.tusdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/Januaiy/03-ag_052.htin;
Press Release, U.S.
Dep't ofiJustice, Fact Sheet, Project Safe Neighborhoods: America's Network Against
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signing their interventions at least in part on the basis of technocratic
empirical analyses of what types of interventions have worked elsewhere. And Project Safe Neighborhoods was itself motivated by the
apparently favorable evaluation results for two local programs: Operation Ceasefire in Boston and Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia.''
CONCLUSION:

PRAGMATIC GUN POLICY

In sum, culture clearly matters for public opinion about gun policy in America, but there is also room for empirical analysis to affect
policy development, not only through its influence on public opinion,
but also through its direct influence on judges, regulatory agencies,
and legislators. Of course, reasonable people will assign different valties to the benefits that a given gun policy might achieve in terms of
improved safety and health, and to the costs that such programs might
entail in terms of the government budget and forgone liberty or convenience, but empirical analysis can, and should, be undertaken to
provide some sense of the magnitude of these tradeoffs. This 2'perspec1
tive is consistent with our own call for "pragmatic gun policy.,
If we accept the argument that there is some role for facts in setting gun policy, then statistical social science research on gun issues
almost surely passes a benefit-cost test from society's perspective. The
costs of gun violence to American society are estimated to be on the

Gun Violence (lan. 30, 2003), available at http://wVw.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2003/
01 3003psnfactsheet.h tin.
31 The perceived success of Operation Ceasefire in Boston came from rigorous
social science research. See generally Anthony A. Braga et al., Probleut-OrientedPolicing,
Deterrence, and Youth Violence: An Evaluation oj Bostons Operation Ceasefire, 38 J. RES.
CRIME & DELINQ. 195, 219 (2001) (concluding that Operation Ceasefire successfully
reduced youth violence). But seeleffiey Fagan, Policing Guns and Youth Violence, 12
FUTURE CHILI). 133, 137 (2002) (arguing that the apparent success was actually part of
a larger statewide trend). The perceived success of Project Exile, however, stemmed
largely from the coincident decline in crime that Richmond experienced following the
program's announcement. More systematic research has since suggested that Project
Exile contributed only modestly, if at all, to this decline. See Steven Raphael & Jens
Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY, supra note 2, at 251, 252 ("We argue that the reduction in Richmond's gun
homicide rates surrounding the implementation of Project Exile was not unusual and
that almost all of the observed decrease probably would have occurred even in the absence of the program."). Anecdotal reports suggest that law enforcement in Richmond was not enthusiastic about the results of the formal Project Exile evaluation,
which is puzzling if statistical social science evidence never persuades.
12 Cook & Ludwig, supra
note 2, at 2.
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order of $100 billion per year.' Suppose that eveiy ten years empirical social science research leads to the enactment of one good idea
(or the suppression of one bad idea), defined as an intervention that
would reduce (or increase) the volume of gun violence by only 0.5%.
In this case, the discounted stream of benefits from such an intervention would be on the order of $5 billion, valued using a very conservative 10% discount rate. Even if every one of the, say, fifty social scientists who currently conduct empirical research on gun policy were
paid $1 million per year (lamentably not the case), the benefits of
conducting statistical research would outweigh these salary costs over
a ten-year period-by a factor of ten! Statistical research on important problems is a sound investment of society's resources, even if one
believes that such research only shapes policy at the margins in most
cases.
Incidentally, this conclusion would surely have been embraced by
the late Aaron Wildavsky, identified by Kahan and Braman as coauthor of the best-known work on the cultural theory of risk.:"' After
all, Wildavsky served for many years as the dean of one of the nation's
leading public policy schools, which are (as we can testify from firsthand experience) hotbeds of statistical research on policy consequences. Indeed, Wildavsky's final word on the subject of health and
safety risks was a book dedicated to helping citizens become better
consumers of scientific research so that they could participate more
effectively in the regulatory process. In words that seem quite relevant to the Kahan-Braman position, he wrote: "The only sure way to
know what we want to know is through the science itself. Citizens who
train themselves to read and understand the primary sources, the
original scientific studies, can participate meaningfully; those who do
not, cannot.":' (
In any event, we encourage other empirically oriented researchers
to join us in resisting Kahan and Braman's call to drop our current research program on the consequences of gun control measures and instead turn our attention "to the project of constructing a new expres-

See. IHILIPI.

COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUN VIOlENCE:

THE REAl. CosTs 113-15

(2000) (estimating the costs to society by considering medical expenses, lost productivity, and contingent valuation data).
1. See Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1296 (citing MARV' DOUGLAS & AARON
WIIDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE (1982)).
35 AARON WILDAVSKY, Bur Is IF TRUE? A CITIZEN'S
GUIDE ro ENVIRONMENTAL.
HEALTH AND SAFE'IY ISSUES 2 (1995) (explaining his purpose to help create an informed citizenry).
36 Id. at 408.
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sive vocabulary for carrying such deliberations forward.'
However,
we would like to invite Kahan and Braman to take their own advice,
noting that with terms like "hierarchy-egalitarianism" and "individualism-solidarism," they have a good start on a new vocabulary that is sure
to capture the imaginations of both sides of America's gun debate.
Meanwhile, the principle of comparative advantage suggests that we
are better suited to running regressions.

37

Kahan & Braman, supra note 1, at 1325.
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s
Table 1: Regression Analysis of Kahan and Braman GSS Data'

Outcome Variable
Favors gtt p)ermit

Sniokes

Last sexual

eICOttt e" ttse(d

Ixpwnatory Vaiable:

reluirettent

Fetiale

.056 (.004)**

-.037 (.009)**

-.026 (.006)**

Black

.001 (.004)

.006 (.010)

.053 (.007)**

Nor theast

.004 (.004)

-.007 (.()09)

South

-.005 (.004)

.001 (.009)

-.004 (.006)

West

-.018 (.004)**

.012 (.009)

-.003 (.00i)

Urbati

.005 (.004)

.009 (.00)

.0)13 (.006))**

Catholic

.031 (.004)**

.007 (.009)

.018 (.006)**

Jewish

.008 (.004)**

-.014 (.009)

-.005 (.006)

Education

.003 (.004)

-.046 (.011)

Socioec:oott ic

.012 (.004)**

-.049 (.01) **

-.022 (.008) **

Party Affiliat(ion

.012 (.004) **

.004 (.010)

-.
009 (.007)

a condonm

.014 (.006) **

023 (.008)**

F'olitical Orietation

.015 (.004)**

.037(.010)**

.0()9 (.007)

Fear of Crimne

.024 (.004)**

.0(19 (.10()

.016 (.007)**

I-lietatchy-Egatlitatiatttism

.027 (.004)**

-.022 (.011)**

.040 (.007)**

.050 (.004)**

.015 (.010)

.014 (.007)**

/?'

tldivi(lt;tlistt-Solidi(aristtt

.082

.049

.046

N

12,077

2,610

4,392

38 Results calcttlated using standardized GSS covariates generously provided to us
by Dan Kahan and Donald Braman. Our regression model set's missing values for the
socioeconomic variable as well as party affiliation and political orientation equal to
zero and includes variable-missing dummies in an attempt to replicate as closely as
possible the sample sizes reported in Kahan and Braman's Table 1. The model also
includes a constant term (not shown). Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * =
statistically significant at .10 level. ** = statistically significant at .05 level. Sample sizes
are smaller for smoker and condom use than for gun control attitudes because these
questions were asked in a smaller subset of years during the 1988 to 2000 period.

